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Abstract
The AGM postulates for belief revision, augmented by the DP postulates for iterated belief revision, provide widely accepted
criteria for the design of operators by which intelligent agents adapt their beliefs incrementally to new information. These postulates
alone, however, are too permissive: They support operators by which all newly acquired information is canceled as soon as an agent
learns a fact that contradicts some of its current beliefs. In this paper, we present a formal analysis of the deficiency of the standard
postulates alone, and we show how to solve the problem by an additional postulate of independence. We give a representation
theorem for this postulate and prove that it is compatible with AGM and DP.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The capability of gathering information about the world and revising its beliefs based on the new information
is crucial for an intelligent agent. Belief revision therefore is a central topic in Artificial Intelligence. Technically,
belief revision is the process of changing the beliefs of an agent to accommodate new, more precise, or more reliable
evidence that is possibly inconsistent with the existing beliefs.
The formal study of belief revision took as starting point the work of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson
(AGM) during the first half of the 1980s [1–3]. The AGM framework studies idealized mathematical models of belief
revision. Given an underlying logic language L, the beliefs of an agent are represented by a set of sentences in L
(known as belief set) which is closed under logical consequence. New evidence is also a sentence in L, and a belief
revision operator incorporates the new evidence into the current belief set to obtain a revised belief set. The authors of
the original AGM framework have developed their theory under two basic assumptions regarding the new evidence:
it is intended to describe facts of the static world; and it is more reliable (hence prioritized in the revision process)
than the prior beliefs. The latter assumption is often referred to as primacy of update. The necessity and ideas of
distinguishing belief revision from belief update (suitable for a situation where the new evidence describes a change
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2 Y. Jin, M. Thielscher / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 1–18of the world) was first noticed by Keller and Winslett [24] and later on formalized in [22]. Belief revision where the
new evidence is not prioritized, is a relatively recent topic studied by many researchers [5,10,12,18]. In this paper, we
will concentrate on the problem of prioritized belief revision where iterations are necessary.
In situations where the new evidence is consistent with the existing beliefs, the two can just be merged; we call this
mild revision. More interesting and complicated are situations where the evidence conflicts with the prior beliefs, in
which case the agent needs to remove some of its currently held beliefs in order to accommodate the new evidence.
This kind of revision is referred to as severe revision [13]. To provide general design criteria for belief revision
operators, a set of postulates has been developed [3]. As first argued by the AGM trio and later frequently repeated
by others [9,13], the guiding principle of the AGM postulates is that of economy of information, or minimal change
of belief sets, which means not to give up currently held beliefs and not to generate new beliefs unless necessary.
However, Rott [33,34] has recently pointed out that “it is a pure myth that minimal change principles are the foundation
of existing theories of belief revision, at least as far as the AGM tradition is concerned”. His argument is mainly based
on the fact that so-called full meet revision [1] discards all prior beliefs in a severe revision and at the same time
satisfies all AGM postulates. This implies that the AGM postulates are too weak to capture the principle of minimal
change.
For the incremental adaptation of beliefs, the AGM postulates proved to be overly weak, too [8,9]. This has led to
the development of additional postulates for iterated belief revision by Darwiche and Pearl (DP), among others (e.g.,
[6,13,27]).
Still, however, the AGM and DP postulates together are too permissive in that they support belief revision operators
which assume arbitrary dependencies among the pieces of information which an agent acquires along its way. These
operators have a drastic effect when the agent makes an observation which contradicts its currently held beliefs: The
agent is forced to cancel everything it has learned up to this point [28,30]. In this paper, we first give a formal analysis
of this problem of implicit dependence, and then we present, as a solution, an Independence postulate for iterated belief
revision. We give a representation theorem for our new postulate and prove its consistency by defining a concrete belief
revision operator. We also contrast the Independence postulate to the so-called Recalcitrance postulate of [28,30] and
argue that the latter is too strict in that it rejects reasonable belief revision operators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we recall the classical AGM approach in a
propositional setting as formulated by [23], followed by the approach of [8] for iterated belief revision. In Section 3,
we formally analyze the problem of the DP postulates to be overly permissive. In Section 4, we present an additional
postulate to overcome this deficiency, and we give a representation theorem for the postulate along with a concrete
revision operator. We conclude in Section 5 with a detailed comparison to related work. Proofs of the main results can
be found in Appendix A.
2. Background
In this paper, we will deal with a propositional language L generated from a finite set P of atomic propositions.
The language is that of classical propositional logic, i.e., with the classical consequence relation . We say that
two sentences α and β are logically equivalent, written as α ≡ β , iff α  β and β  α. As usual, a propositional
interpretation (world) is a mapping fromP to {,⊥}. The set of all interpretations is denoted byW . If an interpretation
w truth-functionally maps a sentence μ to , then w is called a model of μ (denoted by w |= μ). Given a sentence μ,
we denote by Mods(μ) the set of all models of μ.
A total pre-order  (possibly indexed) is a reflexive, transitive binary relation s.t., either α  β or β  α holds for
any α,β . The strict part of  is denoted by <, that is, α < β iff α  β and β  α. As usual, α = β abbreviates α  β
and β  α. Given any set S and total pre-order , we denote by min(S,) the set of minimal elements of S wrt .
2.1. KM postulates
Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) rephrased the AGM postulates for the propositional setting [23]. The beliefs of an
agent are represented by a sentence ψ in L.2 Any new evidence is a sentence μ in L, and the result of revising ψ
2 As L is assumed finite, any belief set can be represented as a sentence (modulo logical consequence). In this paper, we therefore do not
distinguish belief sets from sentences.
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postulates:
(KM1) ψ ∗ μ  μ.
(KM2) If ψ ∧ μ is consistent, then ψ ∗ μ ≡ ψ ∧ μ.
(KM3) If μ is consistent, then ψ ∗ μ is also consistent.
(KM4) If ψ1 ≡ ψ2 and μ1 ≡ μ2, then ψ1 ∗ μ1 ≡ ψ2 ∗ μ2.
(KM5) (ψ ∗ μ) ∧ φ  ψ ∗ (μ ∧ φ).
(KM6) If (ψ ∗ μ) ∧ φ is satisfiable, then ψ ∗ (μ ∧ φ)  (ψ ∗ μ) ∧ φ.
Readers are referred to [14] for the motivation and interpretation of these postulates.
Katsuno and Mendelzon have given a representation theorem for Postulates (KM1)–(KM6) wrt a revision mecha-
nism based on total pre-orders over possible world:
Definition 1. A function that maps each belief set ψ to a total pre-order ψ onW is called a faithful assignment over
belief sets iff
• If w1,w2 |= ψ , then w1 =ψ w2.
• If w1 |= ψ and w2 |= ψ , then w1 <ψ w2.
• If ψ ≡ φ, then ψ =φ .
The intuitive meaning of w1 ψ w2 is that w1 is at least as plausible as w2 from the viewpoint of the agent who
possesses the belief set ψ . The total pre-order ψ is also called a faithful ranking wrt ψ .
We particularly note that the last condition in Definition 1 says that faithful rankings of logically equivalent belief
sets must be identical. This essentially prohibits the possibility that in different situations the agent has the same belief
set but with different preferences among the beliefs.
Theorem 1. [23] A revision operator ∗ satisfies Postulates (KM1)–(KM6) iff there exists a faithful assignment that
maps a belief set ψ to a total pre-order ψ s.t.,
Mods(ψ ∗ μ) = min(Mods(μ),ψ)
Although the KM postulates were meant to be a reformulation of the AGM postulates for propositional logics,
there is an important difference: The AGM postulates do not constrain operations wrt varying belief sets [3], whereas
Postulate (KM4) stipulates that logically equivalent belief sets revised by logically equivalent sentences must result
in logically equivalent (new) belief sets. This essentially implies that a revision operator ∗ is a function on belief
sets (modulo logical equivalence). This, in turn, is highly controversial among the belief revisionists; in fact, it is
commonly believed that this amounts to too excessive a restriction on the conditions of a faithful assignment over
belief sets [9,13,17,30].
We follow this consensus and argue that for a faithful reformulation of the AGM postulates, Postulate (KM4)
should be weakened as follows:
(KM4′) If μ1 ≡ μ2, then ψ ∗ μ1 ≡ ψ ∗ μ2.
The principle of minimal change is often argued to be the foundation of the AGM postulates. Indeed, Postulate
(KM2) says that in the case of a mild revision the agent must retain both the prior beliefs and the new evidence. But
how about the case of severe revisions? The following finding unveils the striking fact that the AGM postulates put
no constraints at all on the retention of prior beliefs in the case of a severe revision. So-called full meet revision [1],
denoted by ∗a , is a revision operator which completely “forgets” the prior beliefs when they contradict the new
evidence:
ψ ∗a μ =
{
ψ ∧ μ if ψ  ¬μ
μ otherwise (1)
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satisfies all of (KM1)–(KM6) [1]. Consequently, in order to sufficiently impose the principle of minimal change, the
KM postulates must be strengthened.
2.2. DP framework
As proposed by many researchers [14,36], a general belief revision operator should exploit some kind of extra-
logical information concerning the preference over different beliefs to determine the revision strategy. In particular,
this preference information should uniquely determine a set of conditional beliefs: An agent is said to hold a condi-
tional belief α 
 β (with α,β sentences in L) precisely when it will believe β after a revision with α [6,15]. The
Triviality Theorem of [14] shows that, when using the AGM postulates, then it is improper to include conditional
beliefs into the belief sets. As a consequence, we need to distinguish a belief set (referred to as propositional beliefs)
from a belief state (also called epistemic state). The latter contains, in addition to its belief set, the conditional beliefs
which determine the revision strategy. In concrete constructions of belief revision operators, this extra-logic prefer-
ence information could take the form of a relation over all possible worlds (as in Definition 1, or a relation over the
set of all sentences [14], or a relation over all subsets of the belief set [3].
Darwiche and Pearl [9] have suggested to make this idea explicit by regarding a belief revision operator as a
function on belief states (rather than on belief sets), that is, a function which maps a prior belief state and new
evidence to a revised belief state. This has resulted in Postulates (R*1)–(R*6) shown below. From a pragmatic point
of view, it is very important that a revision operator delivers a revised belief state instead of a belief set, because only
in this way the revision operator can be iterated when another piece of new evidence arrives. This also conforms with
the criterion of categorial matching [19].
As in [9], for the sake of simplicity we will abuse notation by using interchangeably a belief state Ψ and its belief
set Bel(Ψ ). For example, Ψ and Ψ ∗ μ in Postulate (R*1) refer, respectively, to the current belief state and to the
posterior belief state, while Ψ ∗ μ  μ is just shorthand for Bel(Ψ ∗ μ)  μ. The following are the modified KM
postulates for revision operators on belief states:
(R*1) Ψ ∗ μ  μ.
(R*2) If Ψ ∧ μ is consistent, then Ψ ∗ μ ≡ Ψ ∧ μ.
(R*3) If μ is consistent, then Ψ ∗ μ is also consistent.
(R*4) If μ1 ≡ μ2, then Ψ ∗ μ1 ≡ Ψ ∗ μ2.3
(R*5) (Ψ ∗ μ) ∧ φ  Ψ ∗ (μ ∧ φ).
(R*6) If (Ψ ∗ μ) ∧ φ is satisfiable, then Ψ ∗ (μ ∧ φ)  (Ψ ∗ μ) ∧ φ.
It is easy to observe that these postulates only put constraints on the change of the logical part (propositional beliefs)
of the belief state, and those constraints are exactly the same as imposed by the original AGM postulates. Therefore,
we consider the modified KM postulates (R*1)–(R*6), which are sometimes referred to as a weakening of the AGM
postulates [13,30], to be in fact a proper interpretation of them.
In a way symmetric to Theorem 1, Darwiche and Pearl have given a representation theorem for Postulates (R*1)–
(R*6):
Definition 2. A function that maps each belief state Ψ to a total pre-order Ψ on W is called a faithful assignment
over belief states iff
• If w1,w2 |= Ψ , then w1 =Ψ w2.
• If w1 |= Ψ and w2 |= Ψ , then w1 <Ψ w2.
3 The original version of (R*4) in [9] is as follows: If Ψ1 = Ψ2 and μ1 ≡ μ2, then Ψ1 ∗ μ1 ≡ Ψ2 ∗ μ2 where Ψ1 = Ψ2 means Ψ1 and Ψ2 are
equal. However, Darwiche and Pearl have not given an explicit definition of the notion of a belief state, let alone a definition of two belief states
being equal. This is the reason why we have deliberately refrained from using the equality and reformulated this postulate for the sake of precision.
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assignment over belief sets, since logically equivalent belief sets now are allowed to have distinct faithful rankings.
Theorem 2. [9] A revision operator ∗ satisfies Postulates (R*1)–(R*6) iff there exists a faithful assignment that maps
a belief state Ψ to a total pre-order Ψ such that
Mods(Ψ ∗ μ) = min(Mods(μ),Ψ )
According to the above theorem, for any revision operator ∗ (that satisfies Postulates (R*1)–(R*6)) there exists at
least one faithful assignment over belief states for which the specified condition holds. In general, there could be more
than one such assignment; however, it is not difficult to see that if L is finite then this faithful assignment must be
unique. In the sequel, we will call this the faithful assignment corresponding to ∗.
Theorem 2 only says which models of the new propositional beliefs are obtained after a single revision. In order to
allow for successive revisions, in each revision step it must also be fully specified how the conditional beliefs are to be
modified. Following the principle of economy of information, some restrictions should be imposed on the change of
conditional beliefs, too. By concrete counterexamples, Darwiche and Pearl have shown that the KM postulates alone
are too weak to adequately characterize iterated belief revision, because they support unreasonable revision behaviors
[8]. To overcome this deficiency, they have proposed these four additional postulates [9]:
(C1) If β  μ, then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β ≡ Ψ ∗ β .
(C2) If β  ¬μ, then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β ≡ Ψ ∗ β .
(C3) If Ψ ∗ β  μ, then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β  μ.
(C4) If Ψ ∗ β  ¬μ, then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β  ¬μ.
Motivation and interpretation for these postulates can be found in [8,9].
To provide formal justifications, Darwiche and Pearl have given an extension of the above representation theorem
for Postulates (C1)–(C4):
Theorem 3. [9] Suppose that a revision operator satisfies Postulates (R*1)–(R*6). The operator satisfies Postulates
(C1)–(C4) iff the operator and its corresponding faithful assignment satisfy:
(CR1) If w1,w2 |= μ, then w1 Ψ w2 iff w1 Ψ ∗μ w2.
(CR2) If w1,w2 |= μ, then w1 Ψ w2 iff w1 Ψ ∗μ w2.
(CR3) If w1 |= μ and w2 |= μ, then w1 <Ψ w2 implies w1 <Ψ ∗μ w2.
(CR4) If w1 |= μ and w2 |= μ, then w1 Ψ w2 implies w1 Ψ ∗μ w2.
This theorem gives an elegant characterization of the seemingly natural constraints that the DP postulates impose
on the change of the conditional beliefs: When Ψ is revised by μ, Conditions (CR1) and (CR2) require not to change
the relative plausibility ordering of μ-worlds (¬μ-worlds, respectively); Conditions (CR3) and (CR4) require that if a
μ-world w1 is (strictly) more plausible than a ¬μ-world w2, then w1 continues to be (strictly) more plausible than w2.
In addition, [9] have shown that their four postulates are consistent with the (modified) KM postulates. They did
so by defining a concrete revision operator which satisfies both (R*1)–(R*6) and (C1)–(C4).
Theorem 3 implies that the DP postulates together impose constraints on the change of conditional beliefs. The
following result shows that it is in fact only Postulate (C2) which puts additional constraints on the retention of
propositional beliefs.
Proposition 1. Amnesic revision ∗a satisfies (C1), (C3), and (C4), but violates (C2).
To our knowledge, this observation has not been formalized elsewhere before.
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A different approach to studying iterated belief revision is by defining concrete revision operators. For instance, [6]
has proposed a specific revision operator (known as natural revision) which satisfies the modified KM postulates and
also the following one:
(CB) If Ψ ∗ μ  ¬β , then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β ≡ Ψ ∗ β .
It is easy to see that the DP postulates are a weakening of Postulate (CB), in the sense Postulate (CB) implies all
of the DP postulates but not vice versa.
As shown by [7,9], Postulate (CB) imposes absolute minimization on the change of conditional beliefs:
Theorem 4. Suppose that a revision operator satisfies Postulates (R*1)–(R*6). The operator satisfies Postulate (CB)
iff the operator and its corresponding faithful assignment satisfy
(CBR) If w1,w2 |= ¬(Ψ ∗ μ), then w1 Ψ w2 iff w1 Ψ ∗μ w2.
Note that now w2,w2 |= Ψ ∗ μ is the only case where the relative ordering of w1,w2 in Ψ ∗ μ is not determined,
since Ψ ∗μ must satisfy the conditions of Definition 2. Therefore, Condition (CBR) imposes absolute minimization
on the change of conditional beliefs permitted by the modified KM postulates. At first glance, therefore, it seems that
Condition (CBR) complies with the principle of economy of information.
However, the following example of Darwiche and Pearl shows that Postulate (CB) is too radical, since a severe
revision forces to cancel all previous evidences under any circumstances, which is usually not desirable.
Example 1. We encounter a strange new animal and it appears to be a bird, so we believe the animal is a bird. As it
comes closer to our hiding place, we see clearly that the animal is red, so we believe that it is a red bird. To remove
further doubts about the animal birdhood, we call in a bird expert who takes it for examination and concludes that it is
not really a bird but some sort of mammal. The question now is whether we should still believe that the animal is red.
As argued in [9], we have every reason to keep our belief that the animal is red, since birdhood and color are not cor-
related. However, natural revision requires us to give up the belief of the animal’s color: According to Postulate (CB),
from bird ∗ red  ¬(¬bird) it follows that (bird ∗ red) ∗ ¬bird ≡ bird ∗ ¬bird.
The above discussion suggests that the most conservative way of changing conditional beliefs is overly strict and
not desirable in general.
While natural revision is the most conservative of all possible DP revision operators, another revision operator,
called lexicographic revision (with “naked evidence”) [31], sits exactly on the opposite side of the spectrum. Lexico-
graphic revision satisfies, in addition to Postulates (C1) and (C2), another so-called postulate of Recalcitrance:
(Rec) If β  ¬μ, then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β  μ.
Semantically, Postulate (Rec) corresponds to the following condition [30]:
(RecR) If w1 |= μ and w2 |= ¬μ, then w1 <Ψ ∗μ w2.
According to (RecR), all possible worlds satisfying the new evidence become more reliable than those falsifying
the new evidence, hence (Rec) is also said to impose the principle of strong primacy of update [25], which is arguably
only suitable when the agent has full confidence in the new evidence. Based on its semantic characterization (i.e.,
Conditions (CR1), (CR2) and (RecR)), it easy to see that lexicographic revision is the least conservative of all pos-
sible DP revision operators, effecting most changes in the relative ordering of worlds permitted by the KM and DP
postulates [4]. In the next section, we will give a formal analysis of the problems of the DP postulates in general and
the problems of the greatest conservatism in particular. The discussion on the problems of the least conservatism is
postponed to Section 5.
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Although most counterexamples in [9] against the KM postulates are solved by adding the DP postulates, several
open problems remain. Specifically, the DP postulates are consistent with (CB), hence they do not block counter
examples against natural revision.
Recall Example 1, where the DP postulates, in being compatible with (CB), are not strong enough to guarantee that
the belief of the animal’s color is retained. This can be intuitively explained as follows: After observing the animal’s
color, we are actually acquiring a new conditional belief as a side-effect, namely, that the animal is red even if it
were not a bird, that is, ¬bird 
 red. But none of the DP postulates enforces the acquisition of conditional beliefs.
In the sequel, we first give a formal analysis of this weakness of the DP postulates, and then we present an additional
postulate by which this problem is overcome.
It is well known (see, e.g., [14]) that if a belief state Ψ suffices to uniquely determine a revision strategy that
satisfies the AGM (or the KM) postulates, then the belief state determines a unique, total pre-order Bel(Ψ ) (known as
epistemic entrenchment) over L which satisfies the following conditions:
(EE1) If α Bel(Ψ ) β and β Bel(Ψ ) γ , then α Bel(Ψ ) γ .
(EE2) If α  β , then α Bel(Ψ ) β .
(EE3) α Bel(Ψ ) α ∧ β or β Bel(Ψ ) α ∧ β , for any α and β .
(EE4) If Ψ is consistent, then Ψ  α precisely when α Bel(Ψ ) β for all β .
(EE5) If β Bel(Ψ ) α for all β , then  α.
If α <Bel(Ψ ) β , then we say that the degree of the belief in β is higher than the degree of the belief in α (wrt Ψ ).
Given an epistemic entrenchment, the corresponding belief revision operator is defined by the following condition:
For any β ,
(C*) Ψ ∗ μ  β if either  ¬μ or ¬μ <Bel(Ψ ) ¬μ ∨ β .
Other forms of total pre-orderings on L have been proposed, e.g., [32,38]. In fact, a recent result of Rott [35] shows
that such kind of pre-orderings exist even if the revision operator satisfies only (R*1), (R*3), and (R*4). All of these
orderings require extra-logical information, that is, they cannot be determined by pure logical relations among the
sentences. In the following, we focus on pre-orderings given by epistemic entrenchments; however, our analysis does
not depend on this particular choice and can be easily adapted to the other approaches just mentioned.
To begin with, we define the notion of dependence between sentences wrt a belief state as follows [11]:
Definition 3. A sentence β depends on another sentence μ in belief state Ψ precisely when Ψ  β and Ψ ∗ ¬μ  β .
Two sentences μ,β are called dependent in Ψ if either μ depends on β or β depends on μ in Ψ .
Consider, now, a (non-tautological) new evidence μ. Whenever Ψ  β , condition (C*) implies that if μ <Bel(Ψ )
μ ∨ β , then β is (implicitly) dependent on μ in Ψ . This kind of dependency could be problematic. In particular, it is
possible that two initially independent sentences become, undesirably, dependent after a revision step. In Example 1,
for instance, red becomes dependent on bird after revising by red when natural revision is used.
The problem of natural revision is that it assigns the lowest degree of belief to a new evidence without asserting
conditional beliefs for independence. Thus the new evidence depends on all other beliefs which survive the revision
process. This explains why severe revision necessarily cancels all previous evidences. Of course, this is not merely
a problem of natural revision: In the revised belief state Ψ ∗ μ, regardless of the belief degree of the new evidence
μ, a belief β (logically unrelated to μ) with a lower belief degree will depend on μ unless the revision operator
explicitly asserts the condition μ <Bel(Ψ ∗μ) μ ∨ β . In other words, a rational revision operator has to bring about
explicitly the conditional belief ¬μ 
 β . Symmetrically, a rational revision operator also should take care of the
implicit dependence of the new evidence on other beliefs with higher degrees.
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The analysis in the previous section shows that in order to overcome the problem of implicit dependence, the
revision operator must explicitly assert some conditional beliefs. It is easy to see that the DP postulates only require
the preservation of conditional beliefs when a belief state Ψ is revised with μ: Postulates (C1) and (C2) neither require
to add nor to remove certain conditional beliefs; Postulate (C3) requires to retain the conditional belief β 
 μ; finally,
Postulate (C4) requires not to obtain the new conditional belief β 
 ¬μ. Since none of the DP postulates stipulates
the addition of independence assumptions, a new postulates is necessary to avoid undesired dependencies.
As already mentioned, the revision process may introduce undesirable dependencies in both directions. That is
to say, it could be that the new evidence becomes dependent on existing beliefs, or that it is the other way round.
Prior to stating the new postulate, we show that the DP postulates impose some constraints on the retention of the
independence information in one direction. In the presence of the KM postulates, Postulate (C2) implies the following
(since (Ψ ∗ ¬μ) ≡ (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ ¬μ):
(WC2) If Ψ ∗ ¬μ  β , then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ ¬μ  β .
This essentially means that if β is not dependent on the new evidence μ in Ψ , then it also does not depend on μ
in Ψ ∗ μ.
In order to ensure the explicit assertion of independence information in the other direction, we propose the follow-
ing postulate of Independence (weak version) dual to (WC2):
(WInd) If Ψ ∗ ¬β  μ, then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ ¬β  μ.
Suppose Ψ  μ, then Postulate (WInd) guarantees that if some new information μ does not depend on β in Ψ ,
then it also does not depend on β in Ψ ∗ μ.
As it is too much to require that the new information μ is already believed (i.e, Ψ  μ), we propose the following
postulate of Independence (strong version):
(Ind) If Ψ ∗ ¬β  ¬μ then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ ¬β  μ.
It is not difficult to see that (Ind) is a strengthening of (WInd). The new postulate essentially says that if the conditional
belief ¬β 
 ¬μ is not held in Ψ , then μ does not depend on β in Ψ ∗ μ.
Postulate (Ind) is sufficient to overcome the problem of implicit dependence, as can be shown by reconsidering
Example 1. According to (Ind), (bird ∗ red) ∗ ¬bird  red, given that bird ∗ ¬bird  ¬red. This shows that the new
postulate blocks unreasonable behaviors which are admitted by the DP postulates. In Section 5, we will also argue
that Postulate (Ind) is not overly strict.
4.1. A representation theorem
In order to formally justify our new postulate, we will first provide a representation theorem along the line of
Theorem 3. Thereafter, we will design a concrete belief revision operator which satisfies (Ind).
Theorem 5. Suppose that a revision operator satisfies Postulates (R*1)–(R*6). The operator satisfies Postulate (Ind)
iff the operator and its corresponding faithful assignment satisfy:
(IndR) If w1 |= μ and w2 |= ¬μ, then w1 Ψ w2 implies w1 <Ψ ∗μ w2.
The above theorems shows that Postulate (Ind) is quite natural and not overly constrained: Condition (IndR) re-
quires that a world w1 conforming with the new evidence becomes more plausible than a world w2 violating the new
evidence only if w1 was at least as plausible as w2.
An immediate consequence of Theorems 3 and 5 is that Postulate (Ind) implies both (C3) and (C4).
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(Ind), then it also satisfies Postulates (C3) and (C4).
4.2. An OCF-based iterated revision operator
We suggest to use the modified KM postulates along with Postulates (C1), (C2), and (Ind) to govern iterated belief
revision. To show that these postulates together are consistent, we present a concrete revision operator which satisfies
all of them. The operator is a modification of Spohn’s proposal of revising ordinal conditional functions [36], which
can be viewed as a qualitative version of Jeffrey’s Rule of probabilistic conditioning [16].
Originally, an ordinal conditional function (OCF) has been defined as a mapping k fromW to the class of ordinals.
As in [37], for the sake of simplicity we take the signature of an OCF k as W → N, where k(w) is called the rank
of w. Intuitively, the rank of a world represents its degree of implausibility, that is to say, the lower its rank, the more
plausible is a world. An OCF encodes both a belief set and the conditional beliefs. The belief set Bel(k) is the set of




)= {w | k(w) = 0} (2)
From now on, we use an OCF and its belief set interchangeably; e.g., μ ∈ k means μ ∈ Bel(k), and k ∧ μ denotes∧
Bel(k) ∧ μ.
Given an OCF k, we can induce a ranking of sentences as follows:
k(μ) =
{∞ if  μ
min{k(w)|w |= ¬μ} otherwise (3)
Put in words, the rank of a sentence is the lowest rank of a world in which the sentence does not hold.4 Hence, the
higher the rank of a sentence, the firmer the belief in it, and the belief set consists of sentences with rank greater
than 0. In fact, it is not hard to see that an OCF k determines an epistemic entrenchment as follows:
α k β iff k(α) k(β) (4)
Proposition 3. Given an OCF k, the binary relation k defined by (4) satisfies (EE1)–(EE5).
By a slight modification of Spohn’s Conditionalization, we now define a revision operator which we call reinforce-
ment revision operator. Like Conditionalization, reinforcement revision allows to assign different evidence degrees to
new evidences; standard KM/DP revision is easily obtained as a special case by using a fixed value in all iterations [9].
An OCF k is revised according to new evidence μ with evidence degree m > 0 as follows:
(k∗μ.m)(w) =
{
k(w) − k(¬μ) if w |= μ
k(w) + m otherwise (5)
Reinforcement revision is distinct from Spohn’s Conditionalization [36] in three aspects. First of all, it is merely a
revision operator, whereas Conditionalization defines both a revision and a contraction operator (when the degree of
the new information is 0). Secondly, in reinforcement revision the rank of the new evidence in the revised OCF is the
sum of its old rank and the evidence degree, whereas in Conditionalization the rank of the new evidence is just its
evidence degree. The last, and crucial, difference is that Conditionalization does not satisfy Postulate (Ind).
Assuming the same evidence degree for any new information, satisfiability of the KM postulates along with Postu-
lates (C1), (C2), and (Ind) by reinforcement revision operator is a direct consequence of Theorems 2, 3, and 5.
Theorem 6. Assume a fixed evidence degree for any new information. Reinforcement revision satisfies all modified
KM postulates, DP postulates, and Postulate (Ind).
A stronger result shows that all postulates are still satisfied in the general case, where the evidence degrees varies
in the course of iterated revision. To begin with, we have the following:
4 In Spohn’s original proposal, the rank of a sentence is the lowest rank of a world in which it is true. So the rank of β there is equal to k(¬β)
here.
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are, respectively, identified with ∧Bel(k) and k∗μ,m.
To show the validity of the remaining postulates (in case of varying evidence degrees), we need the following
lemma, which fully characterizes the change of belief degrees of non-tautological sentences.
Lemma 1. Let k be an arbitrary OCF and μ a new evidence with degree m, then for any non-tautological sentence β ,
k∗μ,m(β) =
{
k(β) + m if  μ ⊃ β
k(μ ⊃ β) − k(¬μ) else if k(μ ⊃ β) = k(β)
min(k(μ ⊃ β) − k(¬μ), k(β) + m) otherwise
As a direct consequence of Lemma 1, it can be seen that our reinforcement revision operator has indeed a rein-
forcement effect, that is, the evidence degrees of the new information are accumulated.
Proposition 4. Let k be an arbitrary OCF and μ a new non-tautological evidence with degree m, then
k∗μ,m(μ) = k(μ) + m
From a pragmatic point of view, this is a desirable property in particular for domains where several independent
information sources provide new information. In this case, it is appropriate to sum up the evidence degrees of the
same information from different sources.
Finally, with the help of Lemma 1, we are able to prove that reinforcement revision satisfies (C1), (C2), and (Ind),
regardless of evidence degrees.
Theorem 8. For arbitrary m1,m2 > 0, reinforcement revision satisfies the following conditions:5
(EC1) If α  μ, then (k∗μ,m1)∗α,m2 ≡ k∗α,m2 .(EC2) If α  ¬μ, then (k∗μ,m1)∗α,m2 ≡ k∗α,m2 .(EInd) If there exists m such that k∗¬β,m  ¬μ, then (k∗μ,m1)∗¬β,m2  μ.
Theorems 7 and 8 show that Postulate (Ind) is consistent with the KM and DP postulates. On the other hand, (Ind)
does not follow from these postulates, as can be seen by the fact that (Ind) is incompatible with (CB), the postulate
that characterizes natural revision.
It is worth mentioning that revision operators based on OCFs are particularly suitable for implementations of belief
revision. For instance, in [20] we have presented a method (and its implementation) for the revision of belief bases
which is equivalent to reinforcement revision. Moreover, we have shown that the complexity of reinforcement revision
is lower than that of most well-known operators [21].
5. Related work and conclusion
We have suggested to use the modified KM postulates along with Postulates (C1), (C2), and (Ind) to govern iterated
belief revision, that is to say, any rational iterated revision operator should satisfy all of these postulates. In the belief
revision community there is, however, an ongoing controversy on what the proper framework for studying iterated
belief revision should be. As in Darwiche and Pearl’s original work [8], revision operators are most commonly viewed
as binary functions which map a belief set and the new information to the revised belief set. This is problematic
in two aspects. First of all, the revision operators studied in the AGM theory are local in the sense that a fixed
belief set is assumed. Such revision operators are more appropriately considered as unary functions, which map
the new information μ to a revised belief set K ∗ μ, with the understanding that K is taken to be the background
knowledge [33]. Secondly, the extra-logical preference information should play a role in the revision process. Based
on the characterization of revision operators as unary functions, [30] have proposed to view belief revision as dynamic,
5 Note that, as before, we abuse notation by simply writing k∗μ,m instead of
∧
Bel(k∗μ,m) etc.
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set as the new background knowledge. While theoretically sound, the idea of dynamic revision is technically quite
confusing in the sense that realizing a dynamic revision seems like devising an algorithm which evolves after each run.
Most belief revisionists maintain that (iterated) revision operators should be functions on belief states [8,25,27,33,39],
although there is no consensus on what is a belief state.
Furthermore, while Postulate (C1) is almost universally accepted, Postulate (C2) seems to be more problematic. In
fact, it is mainly different attitudes towards Postulate (C2) which provoke the dispute over the framework of iterated
belief revision. In defense of our framework, we argue that, according to the semantical characterization (Conditions
(CR1) and (CR2)), Postulate (C2) seems just as reasonable as Postulate (C1). If being informed about μ does not
change the relative plausibility ordering of μ-worlds, why should the relative ordering of ¬μ-worlds be changed?
This idea is also supported by Spohn, who argues that it is only reasonable to change the relative ordering between
μ-worlds and ¬μ-worlds [36].
In the sequel, we will first give a detailed comparison of our framework with the most prominent existing ap-
proaches to iterated revision. Thereafter, we will discuss the problems of least conservatism as promised in Section 2.3.
5.1. Freund and Lehmann’s proposals
Freud and Lehmann were the first to point out that Postulate (C2) is inconsistent with the original KM postu-
lates [13]. To avoid the inconsistency, they have suggested to replace the DP postulates by the so-called minimal
influence postulate:
(MinInf) If Ψ1  ¬μ and Ψ2  ¬μ, then Ψ1 ∗ μ ≡ Ψ2 ∗ μ.
According to (MinInf), the revision Ψ ∗μ does not depend on Ψ at all in the case of a severe revision. This is of course
a very strong restriction, which violates the intuition that the prior beliefs should play a major role. Furthermore, in
the presence of the AGM postulates, (MinInf) implies (C1), (C3), (C4) and the following weakening of (C2):
(C2′) If Ψ  ¬β and β  ¬μ, then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β ≡ Ψ ∗ β .
Strong as it is, Postulate (MinInf) is, on the other hand, too weak to rule out amnesic revision. Moreover, from the fact
that the modified KM postulates are consistent with (C2), it follows that the inconsistency of (C2) with regard to the
original KM postulates is due to the assumption the latter made on the signature of revision operators (i.e., that they
are functions on belief sets). As already discussed, this assumption is not accepted, if not denied, by many researchers.
Therefore, the proposal of (MinInf) is in some sense not well-supported.
A conclusion Freund and Lehmann have drawn is that the AGM framework is not the right one in which to study
iterated revision. In a later work, Lehmann therefore has proposed an alternative approach to iterated revision, in
which a belief state Ψ is a finite sequence of consistent (propositional) sentences 〈β1 : · · · : βn〉 (the revision history
of the agent) [27]. In Lehmann’s framework, the iterated revision operator is trivial: Ψ ∗ μ is simply defined as the
concatenation 〈Ψ : μ〉 of Ψ and μ. Similarly, we might denote 〈Ψ1 : Ψ2〉 by Ψ1 ∗ Ψ2. What seems more difficult to
define, however, is a mapping “Bel” from a belief state to its belief set. For this purpose, Lehmann has proposed the
following set of postulates:
(I1) Bel(Ψ ) is consistent.
(I2) μ ∈ Bel(Ψ ∗ μ).
(I3) If β ∈ Bel(Ψ ∗ μ), then μ ⊃ β ∈ Bel(Ψ ).
(I4) If μ ∈ Bel(Ψ ), then Ψ ∗ Ψ1 ≡ (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ Ψ1.
(I5) If β  μ, then ((Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β) ∗ Ψ1 ≡ (Ψ ∗ β) ∗ Ψ1.
(I6) If ¬β /∈ Bel(Ψ ∗ μ), then ((Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β) ∗ Ψ1 ≡ ((Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ μ ∧ β) ∗ Ψ1.
(I7) Bel((Ψ ∗ ¬β) ∗ β) ⊆ Bel(Ψ ) + β .
Readers are referred to [27] for the relation between Lehmann’s postulates and the AGM postulates. It is worth to
mention that Postulate (I5) is in fact just an adaptation of Postulate (C1).
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revision. A widening ranked model is a function λ which maps an ordinal to a non-empty subset ofW s.t.,
(1) for any n,m, if nm, then λ(n) ⊆ λ(m), and
(2) for any w ∈W , there exists n with w ∈ λ(n).
Given a widening ranked model λ, we can inductively define a rank r(Ψ ) and a set of worlds p(Ψ ) for any belief state
Ψ :
• r(〈〉) = 0 and p(〈〉) = λ(0), and
• r(〈Ψ : μ〉) = mino(Ψ,μ) and p(〈Ψ : μ〉) = λ(r(〈Ψ : μ〉)) ∩ [μ],
where mino(Ψ,μ) is the minimal ordinal n s.t., n r(Ψ ) and λ(n) ∩ [μ] = ∅.
The widening ranked revision (thus, essentially, the mapping Bel) is then defined as follows:
Mods(Ψ ∗ μ) = p(〈Ψ : μ〉)
Lehmann has shown that the widening ranked revision generated from a widening ranked model satisfies Postu-
lates (I1)–(I7). Conversely, any revision operator that satisfies Postulates (I1)–(I7) can be constructed as widening
ranked revision. A major problem with widening ranked revision is that it is based on a fixed widening ranked model
which is external to the agent’s beliefs. Therefore, the agent is supposed to adhere to the same revision policy regard-
less of its actual beliefs. Moreover, it is not at all clear where the external, extra-logical preference information comes
from and how it is to be interpreted. Therefore, this kind of revision has been criticized by Rott as embodying a bad
philosophy [35].
5.2. Revision operators with memory
Konieczny and Pérez have proposed yet another framework for iterated revision, which also considers, as the
agent’s belief state, the sequence of consistent sentences the agent has learned [25]. Like in Lehmann’s approach,
the revised belief state Ψ ∗ μ is just the concatenation of Ψ and μ. However, Konieczny and Pérez have suggested
a different set of postulates for iterated belief revision, which are essentially a reformulation of the AGM postulates
along with the following one:6





Postulate (H7) is a kind of associativity law, which expresses the strong confidence in the new information. It is not
difficult to see that (H7) implies (Rec) (cf. Section 2.3).
The postulates proposed by Konieczny and Pérez characterize the so-called revision operators with memory, which
are based on external faithful assignments over belief sets: Given a faithful assignment over belief sets, we can induc-
tively define a ranking Ψ of the possible worlds for any belief state Ψ :
• 〈〉=W ×W , and
• for any w1,w2: w1 〈Ψ :μ〉 w2 iff w1 ≺μ w2 or w1 =μ w2 and w1 Ψ w2.
The revision operator with memory is then defined as follows:
Mods(Ψ ∗ μ) = min([μ],Ψ ) (6)
Just like Lehmann’s revision, a revision operator with memory assumes a fixed (external) faithful assignment, which
means that the agent never changes its revision policy. Hence, Rott’s criticism regarding widening ranked revisions
also applies to revision operators with memory.
6 As L is assumed finite in [25], the conjunction ∧Bel(Ψ1) is a well-defined sentence.
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additionally satisfies the following condition:
• If w1,w2 |= ¬μ, then w1 =μ w2.
Put in words, μ partitions W into two levels, where the lower level contains all μ-worlds while the other level
contains all ¬μ-worlds.
In fact, a basic memory operator is equivalent to Nayak’s lexicographic revision (with “naked evidence”) (cf. Sec-
tion 2.3). Not surprisingly, therefore, Konieczny and Pérez were able to show that basic memory operators also satisfy
all DP postulates.
In their later work, Konieczny and Pérez [26] have suggested to lift the unrealistic restriction by allowing the
faithful ranking of the new evidence to be dynamic, meaning that logically equivalent evidences may come with
distinct faithful rankings. These new revision operators have therefore been named dynamic revision operators with
memory.
Konieczny and Pérez have shown that any dynamic revision operator with memory satisfies (C1), (C3), and (C4),
but violates (C2). Based on this, they have criticized (C2) as too strong [25]. In particular, they have proposed the
following counterexample:
Example 2. Consider an electric circuit containing an adder and a multiplier. The atomic propositions adder_ok and
multiplier_ok denote respectively that the adder and the multiplier are working. Initially we have no information about
this circuit (Ψ = 〈〉), and we then learn that the adder and the multiplier are working (μ = adder_ok ∧multiplier_ok).
Thereafter, someone tells us that the adder is actually not working (β = ¬adder_ok). There is no reason to “forget”
that the multiplier is working, whereas imposed by (C2) we have (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β ≡ Ψ ∗ β , since β  ¬μ.
In favour of (C2), we give a counterargument to Konieczny and Pérez’s criticism. First we observe that a (dynamic)
revision operator with memory is not a single revision operator, unlike what the AGM framework attempts to model.
Since the new information is coupled with a faithful ranking, a revision operator with memory (except basic memory
revision) essentially is a multiple revision operator which revises a belief state with another belief state. After ob-
serving that, it is no surprise that (C2) is violated since this postulate is only intended for single revision operators.
This argument is supported by the fact that basic memory revision does satisfy (C2). From the perspective of single
revision, the behavior imposed by (C2) in Example 2 is perfectly reasonable, since the evidence μ is supposed to be
an atomic piece of information. Note that in case we learned adder_ok and multiplier_ok in succession, then thanks
to Postulate (Ind) we will retain multiplier_ok after the ¬adder_ok-revision. In fact it is not difficult to see that if we
want the revision operator with memory to exhibit the behavior expected by Konieczny and Pérez, then the faithful
ranking that comes with μ should encode the independence of multiplier_ok and adder_ok. This somehow highlights
the subtle distinction between revising by a conjunction of sentences and revising by a set of sentences (with different
plausibility degrees) (cf. the discussions in [29]), which will be further cultivated in the future. Based on the above
argument, we consider (C2) a well justified postulate for single revision operators, although it could be too strong for
multiple revision operators.
5.3. Dynamic revision operators
Independently, [28] have also noticed the inconsistency between (C2) and the original KM postulates. Their solu-
tion to avoid inconsistency has been to view belief revision as dynamic, as mentioned above. By so doing, it becomes
possible to safely accept the DP postulates. The framework of dynamic revision operators is not too different from
the DP framework, except that the former makes explicit the idea of evolutionary revision policy in its postulates, by
distinguishing between an original and a revised policy.
The problem of the DP postulates to be overly permissive has also been studied by Nayak et al. [28,30]. They have
suggested to strengthen the DP postulates by the following so-called postulate of Conjunction:7
7 In [30], (Conj) is written as “if μ  ¬β , then (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗μ β ≡ Ψ ∗ (β ∧ μ)”, where ∗μ denotes the evolved operator after a μ-revision.
Accordingly, they have reformulated the DP postulates in the same spirit.
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In the presence of the modified KM postulates, (Conj) is strong enough to imply Postulate (Rec).
In the following, we argue that Postulate (Conj), while strengthening the DP postulates, is overly strict. To this end,
we show that even Postulate (Rec) is too strong. As shown in Section 2.3, (Rec) corresponds to the least conservatism
in the DP framework. Thus, the following argument is also an analysis of the problems of the least conservatism.
Postulate (Rec) says that, as long as β ⊃ ¬μ is not a tautology, it should be canceled after a successive revision by
μ followed by β , no matter how strong the initial belief in β ⊃ ¬μ. A simple example shows that this behavior may
not be reasonable:
Example 3. All her childhood, Alice was taught by her parents that a person who has told a lie is not a good person.
So Alice believed, initially, that if Bob has told a lie then he is not a good person. After her first date with Bob, she
began to believe that he is a good guy. Then a reliable friend of Alice warns her that Bob is in fact a liar, and Alice
chooses to believe her. Now, should Alice still believe that Bob is a good guy?
According to Postulate (Rec), Alice should not challenge Bob’s morality and still believe he is good, and hence
disbelieve what her parents taught her. But in fact it is at least as reasonable to give up the belief that Bob is good.
This shows that Postulate (Rec) is too strict a criterion for belief revision operators.
With regard to the postulate we have proposed, it is easy to see that (Ind) is a weakening of Postulate (Rec). This
raises the question whether Postulate (Ind) weakens too much. Let us consider an example, taken from [28], which, at
first glance, seems to show that this is indeed the case.
Example 4. Our agent believes that Tweety is a singing bird. However, since there is no strong correlation between
singing and birdhood, the agent is prepared to retain the belief that Tweety sings even after accepting the information
that Tweety is not a bird, and conversely, if the agent were to be informed that Tweety does not sing, she would still
retain the belief that Tweety is a bird. Imagine that the agent first receives the information that Tweety is in fact not a
bird, and later learns that Tweety does not sing.
Nayak et al. claimed that it is only reasonable to assume that the agent should, in the end, always believe that
Tweety is a non-singing non-bird. Indeed, with Ψ ≡ singing ∧ bird it follows from Postulate (Rec) that (Ψ ∗¬bird) ∗
¬singing  ¬bird, since  ¬singing ⊃ bird. Postulate (Ind), on the other hand, does not apply in this case. But
the behavior which is claimed to be the only reasonable one is not generally justified. Suppose, for example, the
agent initially believes firmly that ¬singing ⊃ bird. It is then possible, after revising by ¬bird, that the belief in
¬singing ⊃ bird is stronger than the belief in ¬bird. In this case, after further revising by ¬singing, the agent believes
that Tweety is a bird after all.
5.4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have formally analyzed the problem of implicit dependence which is intrinsic to belief revision
but largely overlooked in the community over the past decade. As (at least a partial) solution to the problem, we
have proposed to strengthen the DP theory by a new postulate of independence. The resulting framework for iterated
belief revision now consists of the (modified) KM postulates, (C1), (C2), and (Ind). We have informally argued
in favor of our new postulate (Ind) by means of examples, and we have given a formal justification by an elegant
semantic characterization. Also, a detailed comparison to related work has shown that our new framework is the most
satisfactory one thus far in the literature. As a conclusion, we argue that the new framework provides better criteria
for the design of rational iterated belief revision operators.
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Proposition 1. The amnesic revision ∗a satisfies (C1), (C3), and (C4), but violates (C2).
Proof. Note that, in the case of the amnesic revision ∗a , a belief state is identified with its propositional beliefs.
Assume  ¬β . According to (1), we have (Ψ ∗a μ) ∗a β = β and Ψ ∗a β = β . Hence, ∗a satisfies (C1), (C2), and
(C3). Moreover, (C4) is vacuously satisfied. In the rest of the proof, we consider the case  ¬β .
Assume β  μ. We consider two cases: 1) Assume Ψ  ¬μ. It follows from β  μ that we have Ψ ∧ μ  ¬β .
According to (1), if Ψ  ¬β then (Ψ ∗a μ) ∗a β = (Ψ ∧ μ) ∗a β = Ψ ∧ μ ∧ β and Ψ ∗a β = Ψ ∧ β; otherwise
(Ψ ∗a μ) ∗a β = (Ψ ∧ μ) ∗a β = β and Ψ ∗a β = β . 2) Assume Ψ  ¬μ. From β  μ, if follows that Ψ  ¬β . Since
 ¬β and β  μ, we have μ  ¬β . According to (1), (Ψ ∗a μ) ∗a β = μ ∗a β = μ ∧ β and Ψ ∗a β = β . Therefore ∗a
satisfies (C1).
Assume Ψ ∗a β  μ. We consider two cases: 1) Assume Ψ  ¬β . According to (1), Ψ ∗a β = Ψ ∧ β . It follows
from Ψ ∧β  μ and Ψ  ¬β that we have Ψ ∧μ  ¬β . According to (1), (Ψ ∗a μ)∗a β is either Ψ ∧μ∧β or μ∧β .
2) Assume Ψ  ¬β . According to (1), Ψ ∗a β = β . From Ψ ∗a β  μ it follows that β  μ. Since ∗a satisfies (*1),
we have (Ψ ∗a μ) ∗a β  μ. Therefore ∗a satisfies (C3).
Assume Ψ ∗a β  ¬μ. Obviously, we have  ¬μ. Consider two cases: 1) Assume Ψ  ¬β . According to (1),
Ψ ∗a β = Ψ ∧β . From Ψ ∧β  ¬μ and Ψ  ¬β it follows Ψ ∧μ  β . According to (1), (Ψ ∗a μ) ∗a β = Ψ ∧μ∧β .
From  ¬μ it follows Ψ ∧ μ ∧ β  ¬μ. 2) Assume Ψ  ¬β . According to (1), Ψ ∗a β = β . Since ∗a satisfies (*1),
we have (Ψ ∗a μ) ∗a β  β . From  ¬β and β  ¬μ it follows (Ψ ∗a μ) ∗a β  ¬μ. Therefore ∗a satisfies (C4).
The following counterexample shows that ∗a violates (C2). Let μ, β , and Ψ be, respectively, p, ¬p, and p∨q (p,q
are propositional atoms). Obviously, β  ¬μ holds. According to (1), (Ψ ∗a μ)∗a β = ¬q and Ψ ∗a β = (p∨q)∧¬q .
Therefore ∗a violates (C2). 
For the proof of the representation theorem, we need the following observation, which is a direct consequence of
Theorem 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose that a revision operator satisfies Postulates (R*1)–(R*6). If  ¬β , then Ψ ∗β  μ precisely when
there exists a world w such that w |= μ ∧ β and w <Ψ w′ for any w′ |= ¬μ ∧ β , where Ψ is the corresponding
faithful assignment.
Theorem 5. Suppose that a revision operator satisfies Postulates (R*1)–(R*6). The operator satisfies Postulate (Ind)
iff the operator and its corresponding faithful assignment satisfy:
(IndR) If w1 |= μ and w2 |= ¬μ, then w1 Ψ w2 implies w1 <Ψ ∗μ w2.
Proof. “⇐”: Assume Ψ ∗β  ¬μ. From Lemma 2, it follows that for any world w |= β ∧ ¬μ, there exists another
world w′ |= β ∧ μ such that w′ Ψ w. Hence, since Ψ is total, there must be a world w1 such that w1 |= μ ∧ β
and w1 Ψ w2 for any w2 |= ¬μ ∧ β . Condition (IndR) then implies that w1 <Ψ ∗μ w2 for any w2 |= ¬μ ∧ β . Due to
Lemma 2, we have (Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β  μ.
“⇒”: Assume w1 |= μ, w2 |= ¬μ, and w1 Ψ w2. Let β be such that Mods(β) = {w1,w2}. From Theorem 2 it
follows that w1 ∈ Mods(Ψ ∗β). Hence Ψ ∗β  ¬μ. Postulate (Ind) implies (Ψ ∗μ) ∗β  μ. Due to Postulates (R*1)
and (R*3), Mods((Ψ ∗ μ) ∗ β) = {w1}. From Theorem 2 it follows that w1 <Ψ ∗μ w2. 
Proposition 3. Given an OCF k, the binary relation k defined by (4) satisfies (EE1)–(EE5).
Proof. Due to the transitivity of  on N, k satisfies (EE1).
Assume α  β . By contra-position, we have ¬β  ¬α. Hence, for any w ∈W , if w |= ¬β then w |= ¬α. According
to (3), we have k(α) k(β), i.e., α k β . Thus k satisfies (EE2).
Assume k(α) > k(α ∧ β) and k(β) > k(α ∧ β). From (3), it follows that there exists w s.t., k(w) = k(α ∧ β) and
w |= ¬α ∨ ¬β . Since k(α) > k(α ∧ β), according to (3), we have w |= ¬α, i.e., w |= α. From w |= ¬α ∨ ¬β , it
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(EE3).
Assume Bel(k) is consistent. According to (2), there exists w1 s.t., k(w1) = 0. From (3), it follows that
k(from(w1)) = 0. According to (2) and (3), Bel(k)  α iff there exists w s.t., k(w) = 0 and w |= ¬α, i.e., k(α) = 0.
Since k(from(w1)) = 0, we have Bel(k)  α iff k(α) k(β), for any β . Thus k satisfies (EE4).
Assume  α. According to (3), k() > k(α). Hence, by contra-position, k satisfies (EE5). 
The following lemma is needed in the proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 3. Let k be an OCF and μ a new evidence, then for any m1,m2,
Bel(k∗μ,m1) = Bel(k∗μ,m2)
Proof. According to (5), k∗μ,m(w) = 0 iff w |= μ and k(w) = k(¬μ), which means the value of m does not affect the
set of worlds with rank 0 in the revised OCF. From (2) it follows immediately that Bel(k∗μ,m1) = Bel(k∗μ,m2).
Theorem 7. For any m > 0, reinforcement revision satisfies all KM postulates (R*1)–(R*6), where Bel(Ψ ) and Ψ ∗μ
are, respectively, identified with ∧Bel(k) and k∗μ,m.
Proof. Obviously, each OCF k can induce a faithful ranking Bel(k) of Bel(k) by letting
w1 Bel(k) w2 iff k(w1) k(w2)
According to (5), k∗μ,m(w) = 0 iff w |= μ and k(w) = k(¬μ). From (3), it is easy to see that k∗μ,m(w) = 0 iff
w ∈ min(Mods(μ),Bel(k)).
If we fix the value of m, then according to Theorem 6, reinforcement revision satisfies all KM postulates (R*1)–
(R*6). From Lemma 3, it follows that satisfiability of (R*1)–(R*6) still holds for varying values of m. 
Lemma 1. Let k be an arbitrary ordinal conditional function and μ a new evidence with degree m, then for any
non-tautological sentence β ,
k∗μ,m(β) =
{
k(β) + m if  μ ⊃ β
k(μ ⊃ β) − k(¬μ) else if k(μ ⊃ β) = k(β)
min(k(μ ⊃ β) − k(¬μ), k(β) + m) otherwise
Proof. Assume  μ ⊃ β . From  β and (3) it follows that there exists w1 |= ¬β s.t., k(w1) = k(β) and k(w) k(w1)
for any w |= ¬β . Since  μ ⊃ β , we have w1 |= ¬μ. According to (5), k∗μ,m(w1) = k(w1) + m. Similarly, for any
w |= ¬β we have k∗μ,m(w) = k(w) + m. Again according to (3) we have k∗μ,m(β) = k(β) + m.
Assume  μ ⊃ β and k(μ ⊃ β) = k(β). From  μ ⊃ β and (3) it follows that there exists w1 |= μ ∧ ¬β s.t.,
k(w1) = k(μ ⊃ β). According to (5), k∗μ,m(w1) = k(w1) − k(¬μ). Since k(μ ⊃ β) = k(β), according to (3) we have
k(w) k(w1) for any w |= ¬β . It follows from (5) that for any w |= ¬β , k∗μ,m(w) is either k(w)−k(¬μ) or k(w)+m.
Therefore, according to (3) we have k∗μ,m(β) = k(β) − k(¬μ).
Assume  μ ⊃ β and k(μ ⊃ β) = k(β). It is not difficult to see, according to (3), that this is possible only if
k(μ ⊃ β) > k(β). From  μ ⊃ β and (3), it follows that there exists w1 |= μ ∧ ¬β s.t., k(w1) = k(μ ⊃ β) and
k(w) k(w1) for any w |= μ∧¬β . Analogously, there exists w2 |= ¬β s.t., k(w2) = k(β) and k(w) k(w2) for any
w |= ¬β . Consider two cases: 1) Assume k(μ ⊃ β) − k(¬μ)  k(β) + m. According to (5), k∗μ,m(w1) = k(w1) −
k(¬μ). For any w |= ¬β , according to (5), if w |= μ, then k∗μ,m(w) = k(w) − k(¬μ)  k(w1) − k(¬μ); otherwise
k∗μ,m(w) = k(w) + m  k(w2) + m  k(w1) − k(¬μ). From (3) it follows that k∗μ,m(β) = k(μ ⊃ β) − k(¬μ). 2)
Assume k(μ ⊃ β) − k(¬μ) > k(β) + m. Since k(μ ⊃ β) > k(β), according to (3), we have w2 |= ¬μ. From (5) it
follows that k∗μ,m(w2) = k(w2) + m. For any w |= ¬β , according to (5), if w |= μ, then k∗μ,m(w) = k(w) − k(¬μ)
k(w1) − k(¬μ) > k(w2) + m; otherwise k∗μ,m(w) = k(w) + m  k(w2) + m. From (3), it follows that k∗μ,m(β) =
k(β) + m. Therefore, k∗μ,m(β) = min(k(μ ⊃ β) − k(¬μ), k(β) + m). 
Proposition 4. Let k be an arbitrary OCF and μ a new non-tautological evidence with degree m, then
k∗μ,m(μ) = k(μ) + m
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Theorem 8. For arbitrary m1,m2 > 0, reinforcement revision satisfies the following conditions:8
(EC1) If α  μ, then (k∗μ,m1)∗α,m2 ≡ k∗α,m2 .(EC2) If α  ¬μ, then (k∗μ,m1)∗α,m2 ≡ k∗α,m2 .(EInd) If there exists m such that k∗¬β,m  ¬μ, then (k∗μ,m1)∗¬β,m2  μ.
Proof. If  ¬α, Condition (EC1) holds trivially. Assume that α  μ and  ¬α. By (5),




α,m2(w) = 0 iff w |= α and k∗μ,m1(w) = k∗μ,m1(¬α) (A.2)
Since α  μ, for any w |= α we have k∗μ,m1(w) = k(w) − k(¬μ) by (5). Since μ ⊃ ¬α ≡ ¬α and  ¬α, it follows
from Lemma 1 that k∗μ,m1(¬α) = k(¬α) − k(¬μ). Hence, (A.2) is equivalent to
(k∗μ,m1)
∗
α,m2(w) = 0 iff w |= α and k(w) = k(¬α)
This and (A.1) implies (k∗μ,m1)∗α,m2 ≡ k∗α,m2 . Condition (EC2) can be proved analogously.
We prove Condition (EInd) by contradiction. To begin with, from the assumption that k∗¬β,m  ¬μ it follows that
 β and  μ ⊃ β . Furthermore, there exists w such that k∗¬β,m(w) = 0, w |= ¬β ∧μ, and k(w) = k(β). With the help
of (3), this implies k(β) = k(μ ⊃ β).
Now assume that (k∗μ,m1)
∗¬β,m2  μ. It follows that there exists w
′ such that (k∗μ,m1)
∗¬β,m2(w
′) = 0, w′ |= ¬β ∧¬μ,
and k∗μ,m1(w
′) = k∗μ,m1(β). Since k(w) = k(β) and w′ |= ¬β , we have k(w′)  k(w). Hence by (5), k∗μ,m1(w′) =
k(w′) + m1 > k(β). But from Lemma 1 it follows that k∗μ,m1(β)  k(β), since  β and  μ ⊃ β . This contradicts
k∗μ,m1(w
′) = k∗μ,m1(β). 
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